The real exchange rate and foreign direct investment in the United States: relative wealth vs. relative wage effects by Michael W. Klein & Eric S. Rosengren
byMichael W. Klein and
Eric S. Rosengrend
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
Relative Wealth vs.
Relative Wage Effects
byMichael W. Klein and
Eric S. Rosengren
February :L992
Working Paper No. 92-2
Federal Reserve Bank of BostonFebruary 27, 1992
The Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Direct Investment




Abstract: There has been a significant correlation between inward foreign
direct investment in the United States and the U.S. real exchange rate since
the 1970s. Two alternative reasons for this relationship are that the real
exchange rate affects the relative cost of production and that the real
exchange rate alters reTative wealth across countries. In this paper we
explore these alternatives by examining the determinants of four measures of
inward foreign direct investment to the United States from seven industrial
countries over the period 1979 to 1988. We find strong evidence that relative
wealth significantly affects foreign direct investment in the United States.
We find little evidence that relative wages have a significant impact on the
determination of foreign direct investment in the United States. These
results are robust to the choice of countries in our sample and when
controlling for changes in tax codes.
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omments. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.The Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
Relative Wealth vs. Relative Effects
There has been a striking correlation between inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the United States and the value of the dollar over the
past dozen years. Foreign direct investment in the United States has tensed
to decrease with a strong dollar and increase with a weak dollar.I The
recent embodiment of this phenomenon saw a threefold increase in foreign
direct investment in the United States accompanying the 60 percent
depreciation of the dollar between 1985 and 1988. This dramatic increase in
the foreign ownership of U.S. land and capital has been a source of public
concern and has fueled popular press reports of the "selling of America.’’~
Attention has naturally been drawn to the relationship between the
exchange rate and foreign direct investment. There are several channels
through which the exchange rate may affect FDI. Currency movements alter
relative wealth across countries. The role relative wealth plays in the
determination of FDI has been demonstrated by Froot and Stein (1991) in a
model in which informational imperfections limit the leverage of firms. A
firm’s relative wealth is thus an important determinant of its ability to
successfully bid on assets. Currency movements affect FDI by altering
relative wealth of firms across countries. Thus a weakening of the domestic
currency favors foreign purchasers of domestic assets and an exchange rate
IThis correlation is not due to a general growth in U.S. assets held
abroad. Froot and Stein (1991) find that foreign direct investment is
significantly correlated with the value of the dollar but foreign investment
in U.S. Treasury bills, foreign portfolio investment in stocks and bonds, and
foreign official asset holdings are not significantly correlated with the
value of the dollar.
~A careful review of the data shows that the extent of foreign control of
domestic assets in the United States, while increasing, is still below the
level found in other industrial countries (Graham and Krugman 1989).depreciation is associated with an increase in inward foreign direct
investment.
A possible alternative explanation for the link between the exchange
rate and foreign direct investment concerns the manner in which currency
movements affect relative production costs, especially relative labor costs.
Underlying previous empirical investigations into the effect of relative labor
costs on foreign direct investment is the concept that FDI represents capital
seeking relatively cheap labor. Relative labor costs among industrial
countries have been largely determined by currency movements during the
floating exchange rate period. Thus, a depreciation of a country’s currency
is associated with an increase in its inward foreign direct investment.
Empirical research supporting this hypothesis includes Cushman’s (1985; 1987)
studies of outward U.S. FDI to five industrial countries and Culem’s (1988)
research on bilateral flows of direct investment among six industrial
countries.
An open question is whether the exchange rate affects U.S. foreign
direct investment through the relative wage effect or through the relative
wealth effect. Evidence presented by F~oot and Stein (1991) demonstrating a
significant correlation between currency movements and inward foreign direct
investment in the United States suggests the important role played by the
exchange rate in determining FDI. These correlations, however, provide only a
weak confirmation of their hypothesis since they are also consistent with the
role relative labor costs may play in determining FDI, because exchange rate
movements have been largely responsible for both relative wage and relative
wealth movements between the United States and other industrial countries over
the floating exchange rate period. For the same reason, it is possible thatthe wage variable used in other studies of FDI has served as a proxy for
relative wealth.
In this paper we investigate the source of the relationship between
foreign direct investment in the United States from seven industrial countries
between 1979 and 1988 and the respective bilateral dollar real exchange rates.
We identify variables that enable us to distinguish between the cost of
production and the relative wealth hypotheses, and we include these in
regressions on a variety of types and measures of U.S. foreign direct
investment. These empirical results support the relative wealth hypothesis but
not the cost of production hypothesis. We demonstrate that these results are
robust to the sample of countries and when controlling for changes in tax
codes.3
3The focus of this paper is more narrow than an attempt to distinguish
among the broadly differing explanations concerning the determination of FDI.
There are several strands in the theory of the determination of FDI. The
industrial organization approach considers a wide range of reasons that a
foreign firm may value domestic assets more highly than a domestic firm.
These include managerial advantages, superior marketing abilities, or product
and process technology advantages. (See Caves 1971 for a summary of these
arguments.) Empirical work suggested by these theories includes industry-
specific empirical studies (e.g. Gordon and Fowler 1983), studies using highly
disaggregated firm data (e.g. Grubaugh 1987), or case studies (e.g. the
discussion in .Graham and Krugman (1989) of color televisions, automobiles, and
banking, pp. 40-43). A second strand of research on the determination of FDI
focuses on the influence Of macroeconomic variables. Empirical work
concordant with this approach includes studies of the influence of taxes on
FDI. (See, for example, Hartman 1984, Boskin and Gale 1986, Scholes and
Wolfson 1988, Slemrod 1989, and Swenson 1989.) Other explanations include the
tariff-jumping motivation for FDI (which we discuss further in footnote 8
below), and the concept that certain asset prices are sticky (which is
actually a corollary of the imperfect-asset-market theory of Froot and Stein
1991) and the view that FDI represents a fixed proportion of the capital
account.I. An Overview of the Foreign Direct Investment Data
The central hypothesis that we study is whether relative wage costs and
relative wealth have had a significant effect on U.S. inward foreign direct
investment during the period 1979 to 1988. An evaluation of this hypothesis
is best served by data on FDI disaggregated by source country. The source
countries in our study include Canada, Germany, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These countries represent
over 78 percent of all U.S. inward foreign direct investment over our sample
period.4
In this paper we employ several measures of bilateral foreign direct
investment, using data compiled by the International Trade Administration
(ITA) and by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U. S. Department of
Commerce. The ITA data provide a transactions roster of all investments and
classify FDI into acquisitions, increases in equity, joint ventures, new
plants and plant expansions, real property, and an "all other" categary. We
employ the total FDI series compiled by the ITA as well as two subsets,
acquisitions and real property. The ITA data are not comprehensive, however,
since they consist only of pubTicly available information. The BEA data are
based upon a confidential survey and thus are more comprehensive than the ITA
data. The BEA measure of foreign direct investment used in this paper
includes foreign acquisitions of existing Ameri-can-owned companies and the
establishment of new companies by foreigners. This represents a subset of a
broader BEA measure of FDI that also includes retained earnings of foreign-
controlled companies and lending to subsidiaries of foreign companies. The
4These countries were picked because their FDI series had complete data
for the time period we study.BEA data series we use characterizes the concept of FDI discussed in policy
debates better than the broader measure, since it does not include components
such as retained earnings that are not directly related to the firm’s decision
on where to invest.
Despite the differences ~n definition and collection, the correlations
between the measures of direct foreign investment are quite high, with the
exceptions of the correlations of the various series with the series on real
estate purchases. In Table I we present correlations of various measures of
FDI that we employ, each measured in constant 1985 U.S. dollars,s The
correlation between the BEA measure (which we call OUTLAYS) and the total ITA
measure (which we call TOTAL) is 0.84. The correlation between OUTLAYS and
the subset of the TOTAL measure representing mergers and acquisitions (M & A)
is even higher, with a correlation of 0.91. The correlation between the total
ITA measure and the subset of that measure representing mergers and
acquisitions is also 0.91. The correlation between the total ITA measure and
its subset representing real estate purchases (LAND), at 0.08, is much lower.
There is a negative correlation between both LAND and the ITA mergers and
acquisitions variable (-0.12) and between real estate purchases and the BEA
OUTLAYS variable (-0.01).
In light of the correlations presented in Table I, it is not surprising
to find that the preponderance of U.S. inward foreign direct investment
represents mergers and acquisitions as opposed to de_ nov0 foreign direct
STo avoid spurious correlation due to differences in country size, these
correlations represent weighted averages of the correlation of the various
measures of FDI for each country, with the weights reflecting each country’s
average level of FDI to the United States.Table I
Correlations of Alternative FDI Measures
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Table 2
Foreign Acquisitions Relative to Overall Foreign Direct
Investment
(BEA data: Inflows from all countries)
Year 1979     1980     1981     1982    1983
ACQUISITIONS
OVERALL FDI .86 .74 .78 .61 .60
Year 1984    1985     1986     1987    1988
ACQUISITIONS
OVERALL FDI .78 .87 .80 .84     .89investment or real estate purchases. The large role played by acquisitions is
confirmed by referring to BEA data on annual U.S. inward foreign direct
investment. In Table 2 we present the ratio of the BEA measure of FDI
acquisitions to the BEA measure of overall foreign direct investment between
1979 and 1988.~ The difference between overall FDI and acquisitions is
"establishments," which represents both de novo foreign direct investment and
real estate purchases. The data in Table 2 show that the dollar value of
acquisitions is always at least 60 percent of the dollar value of overall
foreign direct investment by foreign firms. In half the years between 1979
and 1988, the dollar value of acquisitions is at least 80 percent of the
dollar value of overall foreign direct investment. For the 10-year period as
a whole, acquisitions represent 81 percent of overall foreign direct
investment.7
The empirical analysis we conduct uses FDI data disaggregated by source
country as well as by category of direct investment. Source-country-specifiC
characteristics of U.S. inward foreign direct investment are shown in Tables 3
and 4. Table 3 provides bilateral foreign direct investment summary
statistics: the minimum, maximum, and average values of FDI over the period
1979 to 1988 for each country (measured in billions of 1985 dollars) using the
OUTLAYS series from the BEA. Inspection shows that the United Kingdom is by
far the largest investor in the United States~ with an average investment
~The sum of acquisitions and estabTishments corresponds to the OUTLAYS
measure discussed above~ although the data in Table 2 represent the total
amount of U.S. inward FDI, not just the amount of FDI coming from the seven
source countries discussed elsewhere in our paper. Separate BEA data on
acquisitions and establishments disaggregated by source country are not
available in order to respect the confidentiality of the BEA survey.
7Overall FDI (measured in constant dollars) was higher in those years in
which acquisitions represented a greater share of overall FDI.Table 3
Foreign Direct Investment Outlays by Country





































Cross-Country Correlations of Foreign Direct Investment
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8twice that of the next largest source country, Canada. The Japanese presence
in the United States has increased dramatically over the sample period, with
its minimum value the second smallest of the seven countries, but with its
maximum value, representing the 1988 observation, the second largest of the
seven. The range of values for foreign direct investment from different
countries leads us to allow for different intercepts for each country in the
regression analyses presented below.
Table 4 presents cross-country correlations of FDI (using the BEA
OUTLAYS data series, measured in constant 1985 dollars). No clear pattern
emerges from this table. Countries within Europe do not seem to have a higher
correlation with each other than they do with Canada or Japan. Indeed, the
highest correlations are between Japan and the United Kingdom, Japan and
France, and the United Kingdom and France. There are negative correlations
between the Netherlands and Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands and Japan, as well as between Canada and Germany
and Canada and Switzerland. The range of correlations in this table
illustrates the importance of disaggregating FDI flows by country rather than
by region (e.g. Europe, Canada, and Japan).
ii. The Effects of Exchange Rates, Wages, and Wealth on Foreign ~Direct
Investment in the United States
The theories that bear most closely on the relationship between the real
exchange rate and foreign direct investment are t!he cost of production theory
and the imperfect capital markets theory. We begin this section with a short
description of these theories. A hypothesis consistent with both theories is
that a weaker real exchange rate leads to an inflow of foreign directinvestment, and conversely, a stronger real exchange rate diminishes FDI
inflows. We first demonstrate that this relationship holds for inward foreign
direct investment in the United States from the seven industrial countries in
our sample for the period between 1979 and 1988. The source of this
relationship differs across the cost of production and imperfect capital
markets theories, with the former focusing on the effect of the real exchange
rate on relative production costs (primarily labor costs) and the latter
stressing the role of the real exchange rate in altering relative wealth.
These differences enable us to run regressions that test hypotheses consistent
with one theory against those consistent with the other.8
The cost of production theory focuses on the effect of currency
movements on relative factor prices across countries.9 Relative labor costs
across major industrial countries have been largely determined by currency
movements during the floating exchange rate period. A depreciat~on of a
country’s exchange rate serves to reduce its labor costs in terms of other
currencies. This attracts capital inflows. Foreign direct investment, in
this framework, represents capital moving in to combine with relatively cheap
labor. A hypothesis consistent with this theory is that a decrease in a
country’s relative labor costs, because of either a fall in its relative wages
or a real exchange rate depreciation, increases foreign direct investment.
8Another possible source of the relationship between the real exchange
rate and foreign direct investment is that FDI represents tariff-jumping and
that the threat of protectionism rises with a stronger currency. Th~s
predicts, however, that we would observe a decrease in the amount of inward
direct investment in the face of a weaker real exchange rate, which is at odds
with our results.
9Studies citing this channel include Cushman (1985; 1987) and Culem
(1988).
I0Some prima facie evidence difficult to reconcile with the cost of
production theory is the fact that mergers and acquisitions represent a large
proportion of foreign direct investment; cheap labor may be a reason for de.
novo investment, but it is not clear why it should lead to a change in
ownership. This preponderance of mergers and acquisitions in foreign direct
investment is consistent, however, with the imperfect capital markets theory
of foreign direct investment. This theory focuses on the role currency
movements play in altering relative wealth across countries.I° ReTative
wealth is an important determinant of foreign direct investment in this
framework because informational imperfections in capital markets cause
external financing to be more expensive than internal financing. A currency
depreciation serves to lower the relative wealth of domestic as opposed to
foreign firms. Thus, a depreciation is associated with an increase in foreign
acquisitions of domestic assets.
The correlation between foreign direct investment and the real exchange
rate predicted by both the cost of production and the imperfect capital
markets approaches is found in the data for U.S. inward foreign direct
investment from the seven countries in our sample over the period 1979 to
1988. Regressions testing this relationship are presented in Table 5. The
regressands in this table are the logarithms of the annual series on bilateral
U.S. inward foreign direct investment discussed in the previous section (TOTAL
and its subsets M & A and LAND, as well as OUTLAYS) divided by U.S. GNP.11
1°Froot and Stein (1991) develop this model and contrast its predictions
with a variety of other approaches to the determination of FDI.
11We scale foreign direct investment each year by the nominal GNP of the
United States that year. Using nominal GNP as a deflator controTs for both
changes in the prlce level and changes in the size of the U.S. economy. We
also ran all regressions reported in this paper using as the dependent
11Tabl.e 5








Ln (OUTLAYS/GNPus) -2,26* ,11"
(,5O) (,O3)
Ln (TOTAL/GNPus) -I .58
(.53)
Ln (TOTAL/GNPus) -1.82" .09*
(,51) (,03)
Ln (M & A/GNPus) -2,66*
(.81)




Ln (LAND/GNPus)~ -,07 ,17"
(.78) (.O5)
Fixed-effects regressions, Numbers in parentheses are standard errors,
*Significant at 5% level. a White (1980) test indicates heteroskedasticity at 5% significance level;










variable FDI divided by the U.S. capital stock, The capital stock data are
from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts and represent the estimated
replacement value of the total assets of the nonfinancia] corporate business
sector,L Our results were virtually identical using either GNP or the capital
stock as a deflator,
12The bilateral real exchange rate series represents the ratio of the U.S. CPI
to the dollar value of the source country CPI (thus an increase is a real
dollar appreciation). Regressions are run with ana without trend terms. The
data cover the period 1979 to 1988, and represent inflows to the United States
from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom. In these and in all other regressions presented in this
paper, estimates employ a fixed-effects framework and all variables are
therefore measured as deviations from country-specific means.Iz
The results in Table 5 confirm the predicted relationship between the
real exchange rate and foreign direct investment in the United States. A
depreciation (appreciation) of the bilateral real exchange rate is correlated
with an increase (decrease) in the inflow of FDI into the United States This
relationship is significant at the 5 percent level for three of the four
measures of foreign direct investment we employ. The significance of the real
exchange rate coefficients for these three measures of FDI occurs whether or
not a trend is introduced as a regressor. When the regressions are run
without a trend term, a I percent dollar depreciation is associated with an
increase of overall foreign direct investment relative to U.S. GNP of 1.58
percent (by the TOTAL measure of FDI) and of 1.97 percent (using the OUTLAYS
measure). The response of mergers and acquisitions to movements in the real
exchange rate is more pronounced, with a I percent depreciation being
associated with a 2.66 percent increase in foreign acquisitions of U.S.
companies relative to U.S. GNP. The effects of the logarithm of the real
exchange rate on the logarithm of the ratios of OUTLAYS, TOTAL and M&A to U.S.
12As is well known, the constant term does not appear in a fixed-effects
regression.
13GNP are larger (in absolute value) and more significant with the introduction
of a trend term in the regressions.
Although both the cost of production model and the imperfect capital
markets model predict a correlation between the real exchange rate and foreign
direct investment, the source of this correlation differs across these two
models. The cost of production model predicts this correlation because of the
role of the exchange rate in affecting relative labor costs, while the
imperfect capita] markets model predicts this relationship because currency
movements alter relative wealth across countries. We distinguish between
these two hypotheses in our cross-section time series study by regressing U.S.
inward foreign direct investment on terms representing relative wealth and
relative labor costs, as well as the real e×change rate.
An equation that nests both the imperfect capital markets and the cost
of production hypotheses is presented in [I].
(1)
where superscripts refers to the country (i = Canada, France, Germany,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Japan), and subscripts refer to
the time period (t = 1979 to 1988). This specification ~llows us to
distinguish effects of both relative wealth and relative labor cost on foreign
direct investment from other potential effects associated with the real
exchange rate. The hypothesis that 81 and 82 are negative is consistent with
a relationship between foreign direct investment and factor costs. The
hypothesis that 81 and 83 are negative is consistent with theories that
14predict a relationship between foreign direct investment and relative wealth,
such as the imperfect capital markets theory.
The real exchange rate term,o       ., represents the ratio of the price
E~°P~
level in the United States in year t to the product of the price level in
country i in that year, P~, and the exchange rate in that year, E~, which
represents the amount of foreign currency of country i required to purchase
one U.S. dollar. The relative wage term,    ., represents an index of U.S.
wage costs relative to wage costs in country i (denominated in that country’s
currency) in year t.13 The relative wealth term, St°ck~S,, represents an
s~ock~
index of the value of the U.S. stock market to an index of the value of the
stock market of country i in year t.14 We report results from regressions
that include a time trend and from regressions without a time trend.15
Regression results are presented in Table 6. These results provide
strong support for the hypothesis that relative wealth is a significant
determinant of all measures of U.S. FDI over the period 1979 to 1988. The
coefficient on the relative stock market values (wealth) enters with the
correct sign and is significant at the 5 percent level in all of the
~3The wage, price and exchange rate data are taken from the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics tape.
~The stock market data are from the Morgan Stanley Capital International
Perspective. The Morgan Stanley data are a weighted index representing
approximately 60 percent of each country’s market capitalization. These data
do not include non-publicly traded businesses. Ideally, we would use a
measure of wealth that also includes publicly and non-publicly traded
businesses, the market value of corporate bonds, land, and household sector
wealth. No such data series is available for all the countries in our sample.
15The time trend allows us to control for the increasing presence of
foreign ownership in the United States.
15Table 6
Regression of Real Exchange Rates, Relative Wealth, Relative Wages, and Trend
on U.S. Inward Foreign Direct Investment
Dependent Variable
Ln of Real Ln of Ln of
Exchange Relative ReTative
Rate Labor Costs Wealth Trend
Ln (OUTLAYS/GNPus) -.93 -1.22 -1.69"
(1.06) (.93) (.51)
Ln (OUTLAYS/GNPus) -3.06* .67 -1.21" .]0"
(1.31) (1.15) (.52) (.04)
Ln (TOTAL/GNPus) .28 -2.05* -1.72"
(1.02) (.89) (.49)
Ln (TOTAL GNPus) -.46 -1.38 -1.55" .03
(1.31) (1.15) (.52) (.04)
Ln (M & A/GNPus) 1.49 -4.36* -2.15"
(1.52) (1.33) (.73)
Ln M & A/GNPus) -I.13 -2.02 -1.56" .13"
(1.90) (1.67) (.75) (,06)
Ln (LAND/GNPus)a -6.52* 5.96* -.95
(1.14) (1.21) (.76)
Ln (LAND/GNPus)a -3.84** 3.56** -].56** -.13"*
(2.02) (1.84) (.76) (.07)
Ln (LAND/GNPus) -.07 -1.86" -.21"
(.79) (.83) (.05)
Fixed-effects regressions. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980)
correction.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 10% level.









16regressions in which the regressands are OUTLAYS, TOTAL or M & A. In the
regressions on LAND, the relative wealth term is significant and of the
correct sign at the 5 percent level when relative labor costs are not included
in the regression, and significant at the 10 perCent level when relative labor
costs are included in the regression. Except for the regression on LAND, the
effects of the relative wealth term are robust to the inclusion of a trend.
This is not the case for the effects of relative wages (labor costs) on FDI.
In the regressions with our comprehensive measure, OUTLAYS, the coeffi.cients
on relative wages are not significant, and in the regression with the time
trend this coefficient is of the incorrect sign. The two cases in which the
coefficient on relative wages is significant and of the correct slgn occur in
regressions that do not include a trend term. In no regression with a trend
term is the coefficient on relative wages significant and of the correct
sign. The real exchange rate enters with a significant coefficient of the
expected sign in the regression on OUTLAYS when the time trend is included.16
The lack of a significant effect of relative wages in the regressions in
Table 6 casts doubt on the effect of relatively cheap U.S. labor in attracting
an inflow of forelgn investment. Instead, this table demonstrates a
consistent finding that foreign direct investment is correlated with relative
wealth. Theories that predict such a relationship, such as the imperfect
capital markets theory, focus on the relative ability of firms to bid
successfully for assets. We present further evidence consistent with the
relative wealth hypothesis in Table 7. This table presents a set of
161n all regressions in this paper we have tested for the presence of
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) test. We note those regressions
where we could not reject the hypothesis of heteroskedasticity and we report
the corrected standard error estimate. There was no evidence in any of our
regressions of serially correlated error terms.
17Table 7
Regression on Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions of U.S. Assets Relative to AI7
Mergers and Acquisitions of U.S. Assets
Dependent Variable
Ln of Real Ln of
Exchange Relative
Rate Wealth Trend R~
Ln M & Aforeign -3.18"
M ~ AalI us
(.67)
.27
Ln M & Afozeign -3.35* -]. 45* I~ & AalI us
(.66) (.67)
.32
M & A~oreign                -3.45* -]. 19"* .05
M & AaII us
(.66) (.70) (.04)
Fixed-effects regressions. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 10% level.
.33
18regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of
publicly announced foreign-financed mergers and acquisitions (our M & A
variable) scaled by the total amount of publicly announced mergers and
acquisitions in the United States.17 The imperfect capital markets
hypothesis suggests that the real exchange rate and relative wealth should be
negatively correlated with the ratio of the value of mergers and acquisitions
by foreigners relative to the value of all mergers and acquisitions. The cost
of production hypothesis makes no prediction concerning the ratio of the value
of mergers and acquisitions undertaken by foreign as opposed to domestic
investors. The results in Table 7 demonstrate that the relative amount of
mergers and acquisitions undertaken by foreign as opposed to domestic
investors is significantly correlated with relative wealth and the real
exchange rate. These results reinforce the conclusion drawn from the results
presented in Table 6 that support the imperfect capital markets hypothesis of
the determination of foreign direct investment against the alternative of the
cost of production hypothesis.IB
III. Robustness to Countries in Sample and Tax Effects
The above results demonstrate that the significance of the relative
wealth effect on FDI is robust to the specification of the regression equation
17The annual total value of mergers and acquisitions is taken from
Merqerstat Review. This series represents publicly announced formal transfers
of ownership of at least 10 percent of a company’s equity where the purchase
price is at least one million dollars and where one of the parties IS a U.S.
company. These data compare closely to the ITA measure M & A used elsewhere
in this paper.
~8Coefficients on relative wage variables were not significant when
included in these regressions. The coefficients on relative wealth variables
were basically unaffected by the inclusion of relative wage variables.
19while the significance of the relative labor cost is not. In this section we
first demonstrate that the significance of the coefficient on the relative
wealth variable also remains robust to the choice of the countries included in
the sample, while the significance of the coefficient on the relative labor
cost variable is sensitive to the countries included. We conclude this
section by showing that the results are also robust to the inclusion of dummy
variables that proxy for changes in the tax code over our sample period.
The results presented in Table 8 demonstrate the sensitivity of our
results to the choice of countries. In this table we report F-tests for the
equality of the slope coefficients between the full sample and samples in
which one country is omitted. These tests, which are run for regressions
using In(OUTLAYS/GNPus) as the dependent variable, show that the regression
results are not significantly affected by dropping any one country from the
sample except for the Netherlands.
The consequence of dropping the Netherlands from the sample is shown in
Table 9. In panel A of Table 9 we present regressions in which we exclude all
the Dutch observations from the sample. If we compare these results with the
results for the full sample, we find that the coefficient on the relative
wealth variable is larger (in absolute value) for OUTLAYS and M & A and is
more significant for all three measures of FDI when the Netherlands is
omitted. The coefficient on the relative wage variable remains insignificant
when the Netherlands is omitted.19
19We do not report the regressions on LAND here since the wage variable
does not enter with the correct sign even in the full sample regressions. In
the subsamples discussed here~ relative wages enter the LAND regression with
positive coefficients that are significant and relative wealth enters the
regressions with negative coefficients that are significant.
2OTable 8
Tests of Equality of Slope Coefficients When Countries Are Omitted from the Samgle
Omitted Country:     Canada France     Germany     United Kingdom    Swizerland     Japan
X2(4,55)Statistic: .03 1.03 .90 .07 1.62 .34
Dependent variable ~s In(OUTLAYS/GNPus).
relative stock market values, and trend.
*Significant at 5% level¯
Netherlands
4.22*
Regressors include real exchange rate, relative labor costs,
Fixed-effects regression.
Table 9
A. Regressions Omitting All Netherlands Data from the Sample
Ln of Real Ln of Ln of
Exchange Relative Relativel
Dependent Variable Rate Labor Costs Wealth
Ln (OUTLAY$/GNPus) -2.51" .48 -1.51"
(1.16) (1.01) (.48)
Ln (TOTAL/GNPus -.50 -1.45 -1.50"
(1.20) (1.03) (.50)













B. Regressions Omitting Netherlands Data for 1979 and 1986 from the Samgle
Dependent Variable
Ln of Real Ln of Ln of
Exchange Relative Relative
Rate Labor Costs Wealth Trend




Ln (TOTAL/GNPus) -.35 -1.31 -1.67" .05
(1.28) (1.12) (.51) (.04)




Fixed-effects regressions. Standard errors in ~arentheses.
*Significant a~ 5% leve..
**Significant at 10% level.
.37
.44One possible reason that the inclusion of the Netherlands alters the
regression results is that the Dutch data are "lumpy." Specifically, Dutch
purchases of U.S. assets are marked by two large transactions: the 1979
purchase of Belridge Oil Co. by Royal Dutch Shell for $3.65 billion, and the
1987 purchase of Chesebrough-Ponds Inc. by Unilever for $3.1 bilTion, each of
which represented roughly 70 percent of total Dutch OUTLAYS in its respective
year. We investigate the importance of these two data points by presenting,
in panel B of Table 9, regression results with only the Dutch observations for
1979 and 1986 omitted. Agafn, relative wealth enters the regression with a
negative and significant coefficient when these two observations are dropped
from the full sample.
Another test for the robustness of our results considers whether
controlling for changes in tax laws affects the significance of relative
wealth or relative labor costs.2° In Table 10 we present the coefficients of
the real exchange rate, relative wealth, and relative labor costs from
regressions in which we include dummy variables that capture the effects of
the 1981 tax cut and the 1986 tax reform act. There are two sets of
countries, one for countries that have a territorial tax system (Canada,
2°Our goal here is more modest than achieving a full understanding of the
link between changes in tax laws and foreign direct investment, which is the
focus of research by Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Swenson (1989),
and Slemrod (1989). These studies regress measures of effective tax rates on
FDI, with Hartman and Boskin and Gale studying multilateral FDI flows, Swenson
focusing on industry-level multilateral flows, and Slemrod analyzing both
multilateral and bilateral data. While the studies using multilateral data
find significant effects of effective tax rates on FDI, Slemrod fails to find
a significant correlation in the bilateral data.
22Table 10
Controlling for Tax Effects on U.S. Inward Foreign Direct Investment
Independent Dependent Variable
Variables OUTLAY TOTAL M & A
Ln (Real -3.20* .54 -1.05
Exchange Rate) (1.36) (1.41) (2.04)
Ln (Relative .36 -1.75 -2.95
Wages) (1.25) (1.30) (1.88)
Ln (Relative -1.18" -1.68" -1.80"




Trend .12" .02 .10 -.17"
(.O4) (.O4) (.06) (.07)
TAX-81-86-T .20 .24 .51 1.07"
(.31) (.32) (.46) (.49)
TAX-81-86-W -.06 .34 .34 .36
(.42) (.44) (.63) (.67)
TAX-87-T -.06 .10 -.01 .62
(.38) (.39) (.57) (.60)
TAX-87-W -1.18 .62 .54 -.27
(.57) (.59) (.86) (.92)
R2 .45 .36 .43 .34
Fixed effects regressions.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 10% level.
23France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) and one for those countries
with .a worldwide approach towards taxing the income of foreign subsidiaries of
domestic corporations (Japan and the United Kingdom).21 For each set of
countries, there are two dummy variables. One set of dummy variables is meant
to capture the effects of accelerated depreciation during the 1981 to 1986
period. These two dummy variables, TAX-81-86-T and TAX-81-86-W, take the
value 1 for the years 1981 to 1986, while the accelerated depreciation
allowances were in effect, and 0 otherwise, for the countries with territorial
and worldwide tax systems, respectively. The other set of dummy variables is
meant to capture the effects of the repeal of the General Utilities Rule in
1987. These dummy variables, TAX-87-T and TAX-87-W, take the value I in 1987
and 0 otherwise, for the countries with territorial and worldwide tax systems,
respectively.
The results of regressions run with the tax dummy variables presented in
Table 10 are very similar in the significance and value of the coefficients to
the corresponding results presented in Table 6. The values of the
coefficients on relative wealth in this table also are close to the
21Under a worldwide tax system, as is found in Japan and the United
Kingdom, income from foreign subsidiaries is taxed by the home government but
tax credits are given for taxes paid to host-country governments. Conversely,
corporate profits arising from foreign subsidiaries are not taxed by the home-
country government of multinationals under the territorial system found in
Canada and the continental European countries in the sample. The benefits of
a U.S. tax cut and the resulting lower tax liabilities to the U.S. government
for a foreign firm with headquarters in a country with a worldwide tax system
are offset by lower tax credits from that firm’s home government. Indeed,
since a tax cut in the United States would benefit domestic firms, but not
firms headquartered in a country with a worldwide tax system, a tax cut may
actually d~crease the amount of direct investment i~ the United States from
countries with a worldwide tax system. A firm headquartered in a country with
a territorial tax system, however~ would benefit from a tax cut on the
operations of its subsidiaries in the United States. (See Scholes and Wolfson
1988.)
24corresponding values of the coefficients presented in Table 6. All the
relative wealth coefficients in Table 10 are negative and significant at the 5
percent level. The value of the real exchange rate terms in this table are
close to those obtained when the tax dummy variables are not included. The
pattern of significance of the real exchange rate terms is unchanged by the
tax dummy variables. The values and the pattern of significance of the
relative wage variables are also little affected by the inclusion of tax dummy
variables. None of the relative wage terms enter the regressions in Table 10
with a significant sign.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we consider the reason for the link between the real
exchange rate of the dollar and the flow of foreign direct investment into the
United States. We distinguish between relative wealth and relative labor cost
hypotheses. The data consistently support the significance of the relative
wealth channel and fail to support the relative labor cost channel. This
analysis demonstrates that previous studies that attributed a significant
effect on foreign direct investment to real wage movements may instead have
been picking up relative wealth effects.
The evidence presented here on the significant link between foreign
direct investment and relative wealth does not, by itself, support a
particular theory of the manner in which relative wealth determines foreign
direct investment. Relative wealth may matter because of the presence of
imperfect capital markets, as in the theoretical model of Froot and Stein
(1991). Our finding that relative wealth matters is also consistent, however,
with an explanation in which country-specific productivity shocks affect both
25the relative wealth of a country and the amount of foreign direct investment
undertaken by its investors.
Recent events tend to support the imperfect capital markets explanation
for the link between relative wealth and foreign direct investment, as opposed
to an explanation based upon country-specific productivity shocks.
Productivity Increases in both Japan and Canada outpaced those in the United
States between 1989 and 1991.~z Real exchange rates between these countries
and the United States were fairly stable during this period. The stock market
indices of both Japan and Canada fell relative to that of the United States in
this period, with the Toronto index falling 8 percent from 1989 to 1990 and
the Tokyo stock price index falling almost 30 percent between July and
September of 1990, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased 20 percent
from its 1989 average to its value in September 1991.23 Foreign direct
investment into the United States from Canada declined 57 percent from 1989 to
1990 (BEA data). Foreign direct investment into the United States from Japan,
which doubled between 1987 and 1988, rose only 20 percent between 1989 and
1990 and fell in 1991 (based upon 1991 Flow of Funds data). This recent fall
in foreign direct investment from Japan, observed in the face of continued
Japanese relative productivity growth, is consistent with the imperfect
capital markets theory of foreign direct investment and complements the
evidence presented in this paper. It suggests that the important role played
by relative wealth in the determination of foreign direct investment occurs
through imperfections in the capital market.
Z~See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 1991,
Table A 10, p. 95.
~3These data are taken from The Nikko Chartroom, November 1991.
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